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Summary
According to a popular conception of reasoning, the thinker fi rst mentally rep-
resents given information and then processes the resulting representations. It 
is commonly assumed, at least implicitly, that diffi culty of the representation 
step is solely a function of facility with the form and content of the infor-
mation to be represented, while diffi culty of the processing step is solely a 
function of facility with the operation(s) necessary to meet the task require-
ments. Within this two-step information processing model, form/content vari-
ables and task requirements should thus have an additive effect on problem 
diffi culty. To test this prediction, 72 male students in grades 7, 10, and college 
were presented with two tasks involving the same set of logical propositions. 
The effects of both form and content were found to be a function of task. 
These interactions seem to contradict the notion that form/content and task 
variables relate exclusively to different steps in reasoning. Theoretical impli-
cations of these results for the concepts of representation and process are dis-
cussed from information-processing, statistical, and structural perspectives. 
A.  Introduction
Current conceptions of reasoning distinguish “representation” from “pro-
cess,” and relate these different steps in reasoning (e.g., 4, 9). For a task in-
volving deduction, induction, hypothesis-testing, or problem-solving of any 
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sort, it seems reasonable to suppose that the thinker must fi rst mentally rep-
resent the relevant data and then process them in accord with the demands 
of the task. With respect to reasoning about logical relationships, in particu-
lar, it is commonly hypothesized that a person fi rst mentally represents (inter-
prets, encodes) the information embedded in the form and content of the re-
lationships, and then processes (operates on) the resulting representation(s) 
(e.g., 3, 15, 21, 25). The Brée model (3), for example, proposes that subjects 
test hypothetical implication relationships in Wason’s (28) well-known “four-
card task” by fi rst encoding them and then subjecting these encodings to one 
of three processing strategies. 
Two reasonable further postulates, though usually left implicit, seem to 
underlie most of these information-processing models. The fi rst is that, in any 
instance of reasoning by any individual, the nature of the representation and 
the diffi culty of the representation step are solely a function of the form and 
content involved. The second postulate is that the nature of the person’s pro-
cessing and the diffi culty of the processing step are solely a function of the 
operation(s) necessary to meet the task requirements. Thus, for example, the 
oft-demonstrated effects of form and content on the conclusions subjects reach 
on reasoning tasks (e.g., 1, 6, 8, 11, 22, 27, 30) would be explained within this 
two-step information-processing paradigm as due to effects of form and con-
tent variables on the diffi culty of representing the given information (in step 
1) and the nature of those representations. 
Thus, the existence of two relatively discrete and ordered steps in pro-
cessing information, as just described, is a common assumption which serves 
as the starting point for more specifi c theories and models regarding the na-
ture of each step (see citations above). Although this simplifying assumption 
has considerable heuristic value, it has probably been accepted too uncriti-
cally. A bit of refl ection suggests that the two-step model outlined above is 
precise enough to have some fairly clear and testable empirical consequences. 
Specifi cally, if the model is correct, it follows that the effects of form and 
content variables would not be a function of task, since such an interaction 
would indicate either that task requirements are affecting the initial represen-
tation of form/content information (contrary to postulate 1), or that form/con-
tent variables are affecting the subsequent processing of the representation(s) 
(contrary to postulate 2). In other words, if form/content variables and task 
variables relate exclusively to different steps of reasoning, they should have 
additive (noninteractive) effects on reasoning performance. 
Unfortunately, the massive literature on reasoning about logical relation-
ships provides limited information about task differences in the effects of form 
and content variables because of manipulation of such variables only within 
the confi nes of single tasks. Comparison across studies does provide some ev-
idence diffi cult to reconcile with the simple two-step model sketched above. 
For example, meaningful (as opposed to abstract) content has been shown to 
facilitate reasoning with conditional relations on the four-card task (e.g., 1, 
11, 30) but to hinder use of conditional premises in deductive reasoning (23). 
Such comparison across studies is dangerous, however, since it is well estab-
lished that major differences in reasoning may result from minor variations in 
wording of presented propositions, task instructions, subject characteristics, 
and so on (e.g., 26). To allow more rigorous within-study comparisons, each 
subject in the present experiment did two sorts of tasks, each involving the 
same set of logical relations varying systematically in form and content. On 
the basis of the simple model of reasoning outlined above, any effects of form 
and content should hold across tasks. 
B. Method
1. Subjects and Procedure
Twenty-four bright male volunteers in each of grades 7, 10, and college were 
tested in groups of up to four (total N = 72). The experimenter handed out test 
booklets and read the instructions aloud, while students read along in their 
own booklets. After soliciting questions, the experimenter remained present 
while students continued individually. 
2. Materials
Each student received a fi ve-page test booklet. The fi rst page presented 
general instructions and defi nitions regarding hypotheses, truth, falsity, and 
proof. On each of the next four pages was a hypothesis to be tested (e.g., of 
the form If p then q), followed by eight data descriptions of the form p · q (p 
and q), p · q¯ (p and not q), p¯  · q, p¯  · q¯, q ·  p, q · p¯ , q¯ ·  p, and q¯ ·  p¯ , with space 
next to each data description for the student to indicate whether it proved the 
hypothesis true, proved it false, or neither. For example, given the hypothe-
sis If a person uses fl uoridated toothpaste he will have healthy teeth, the data 
descriptions would read Albert uses fl uoridated toothpaste and has healthy 
teeth, Bertie uses fl uoridated toothpaste and does not have healthy teeth, etc. 
This evaluation task (cf. 5, 12, 28) assessed the ability to evaluate the consis-
tency of specifi c information with a given hypothesis. 
Following this part of each page, the student was asked to decide whether 
it would be better to test the hypothesis by studying q’s or by studying q¯’s (in 
each case to see whether they are p or p¯  ). In the above example, the choice 
would be between (a) asking patients with healthy teeth whether or not they 
use fl uoridated toothpaste, and (b) asking patients who don’t have healthy 
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teeth whether or not they use fl uoridated toothpaste. The latter is the cor-
rect choice, since only people who use fl uoridated toothpaste and don’t have 
healthy teeth disprove the hypothesis. Finally, at the bottom of each page, the 
student was asked to explain the basis for his choice. The essential purpose of 
this hypothesis-testing problem (derived from Wason’s [28] four-card task) is 
to assess the realization that to test a hypothesis one must seek information 
that could falsify it. 
3. Design
The four test pages in each booklet were selected from a set of 16, iden-
tical in format but differing in the hypothesis presented. The 16 hypotheses 
were produced by factorially combining four logical forms (If p then q; All p 
are q; If p then q¯; No p are q) with four content areas (toothpaste fl uoridation, 
student performance, canine character, and automotive maintenance (see Ta-
ble 1). 
Since only four of the 16 factorial combinations of form and content were 
used in each test booklet, and since they had to be arranged in some order, 
the variables form, content, and serial position were necessarily confounded 
within any test booklet. By constructing the test booklets in groups of four, 
however, it was possible to use a Greco-Latin square design in which (a) each 
form, each content area, and of course each serial position appeared exactly 
once in each text booklet, and (b) the variables form, content, and position 
were mutually orthogonal within sets of four booklets. Three Greco-Latin 
squares were randomly selected and used to construct 12 variants of the test 
booklet, each of which was used by two subjects at each grade level. 
4. Scoring
To be credited with an “appropriate” (i.e., material implication) evalua-
tion pattern for a given hypothesis, a student had to meet three criteria. First, 
each of the last four data descriptions was evaluated identically to its logically 
identical counterpart among the fi rst four (e.g., identical evaluations for p • q 
and q • p). Second, the student correctly evaluated as disconfi rmatory those 
data descriptions-and only those data descriptions- that indeed disconfi rmed 
the hypothesis (e.g., for If p then q, p • q¯, and q¯ • p). Finally, if any data de-
scriptions were evaluated as conclusively verifying, they were not such as to 
suggest a biconditional orientation, in which the implication relationship is 
construed as implying its converse (e.g., identical evaluation of p • q and  p¯ • 
q¯ ). Evaluations suggesting biconditionality were systematically identifi ed and 
disallowed on the basis of previous evidence that this is a common misinter-
pretation of conditional statements (e.g., 5, 26). 
Credit for a “correct” (i.e., falsifi cation-based) hypothesis-testing re-
sponse for any hypothesis was contingent upon selecting the hypothesis-test-
ing choice that could falsify the hypothesis and providing a falsifi cation ex-
planation. Explanations were considered to refl ect falsifi cation provided the 
student either (a) explicitly indicated that one should test the hypothesis by 
trying to prove it false, or (6) cited as the crucial consideration a potential da-
tum which, according to his own data evaluations, would prove the hypothe-
sis false. Recoding of 50 randomly selected explanations by an independent 
coder showed 94% agreement. 
The methodological decision to require both correct judgment and ap-
propriate explanation from the subjects perhaps requires some justifi cation. 
With respect to the use of explanations, Piaget’s (20) work on consciousness 
suggests that cognizance of one’s own mental activity is neither the effi cient 
cause of that activity nor a direct effect or illumination of it, but rather a com-
plex reconstruction on a new level of abstraction. Similarly, Wason and Evans 
(29, p. 150) suggest, among other possibilities, that consciousness and lower-
order cognitive activities may best be viewed not as having a simple cause 
Table 1
The 16 Hypotheses Used in Constructing the Test Booklets
Content  Forma  Hypothesis 
Toothpaste  If p then q  If a person uses fl uoridated toothpaste he will have healthy  
  teeth.
Toothpaste  All p are q  All people who use fl uoridated toothpaste have healthy teeth. 
Toothpaste  If p then q¯  If a person uses fl uoridated toothpaste he will not get cavities. 
Toothpaste  No p are q  No one who uses fl uoridated toothpaste gets cavities. 
Student  If p then q  If a student works hard in school he will get good grades. 
Student  All p are q  All students who work hard in school get good grades. 
Student  If p then q¯  If a student works hard in school he will not fail his courses. 
Student  No p are q  No student who works hard in school fails his courses. 
Dog  If p then q  If a dog barks a lot it will be a good watchdog.
Dog  All p are q All dogs that bark a lot make good watchdogs.
Dog  If p then q¯ If a dog barks a lot it will not be a good pet.
Dog  No p are q No dog that barks a lot makes a good pet.
Engine  If p then q  If an auto engine was just tuned up it will run smoothly. 
Engine  All p are q  All auto engines that were just tuned up run smoothly. 
Engine  If p then q¯  If an auto engine was just tuned up it will not make knocking  
  sounds.
Engine  No p are q  No auto engine that was just tuned up makes knocking  
  sounds. 
a q¯ = not-q. 
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and effect relation (in either direction) but rather as semiautonomous and dia-
lectically interacting processes. There are thus good theoretical and empirical 
reasons to doubt that Ss’ introspections provide clear and direct accounts of 
their actual mental processes. On the other hand, it requires at least as great a 
leap of inference to infer subjects’ mental activities from a limited number of 
behavioral responses. Van Duyne (27, pp. 93-94), for example, indicated that 
attention to subjects’ verbalizations in addition to their selections on a variant 
of the four-card task enabled him to avoid many serious misinterpretations. 
The use of both judgments and explanations in the present study was thus 
based on the assumption that no methodology yields direct insight into men-
tal processes, and that the best inferences about subjects’ reasoning are, there-
fore, those resting on the broadest and most varied base of data (cf. 14). 
C. Results
Each subject had an opportunity to show an implication interpretation on 
each of the four hypotheses he was exposed to. It can be calculated from Ta-
ble 2 that the proportion of implication evaluations for the entire sample was 
.41. Based on the null hypothesis that each of a given subject’s four evalua-
tions is independent of his others, binomial predictions were calculated for 
frequencies of 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 implication evaluations. Actual frequencies 
were found to deviate signifi cantly from expectation [χ2(2) = 28.21, p < .001], 
and inspection of the marginal totals for evaluation in Table 2 indicates that 
this was due to a marked trend toward consistency in either applying or not 
applying an implication interpretation. 
A comparable analysis for use of falsifi cation strategy (see Table 2) 
showed an overall proportion of .32 and a signifi cant trend in the direction 
of individual consistency χ2(2) = 63.85, p < .001]. Furthermore, a test of in-
dependence on the 3 × 3 table formed by collapsing the 1,2, and 3 categories 
confi rmed the signifi cance of the obvious positive relationship between impli-
cation evaluation and falsifi cation strategy [χ2(4) = 30.53, p < .001]. 
In light of the issues raised previously regarding use of both choices and 
explanations to infer falsifi cation strategy, it is of interest to look at the rela-
tion between them. Ignoring explanations, there were 16 possible patterns (24) 
in choosing one of the two experiments to test each of the four hypotheses. 
These included consistent choice of potentially falsifying experiments, con-
sistent choice of potentially verifying experiments (cf. 13), consistent choice 
of the experiment matching a value named in the hypothesis (cf. 4, 5), and 13 
miscellaneous patterns of no obvious theoretical import. The consistent falsi-
fi cation pattern accounted for 35% of the Ss, and no other response pattern ac-
counted for more than 10%. Moreover, Ss consistently choosing the falsifi ca-
tion experiment showed a higher proportion of falsifi cation explanations than 
those not consistently making that choice [.73 vs. .13, χ2(2) = 36.88, p < .001]. 
Thus, falsifi cation choices and explanations are strongly related and probably 
refl ect real mental processes. 
Age differences on these tasks, the nature of immature responses, and the 
implications of these fi ndings for developmental theory have been discussed 
elsewhere (17). For present purposes, it is the effects of form and content that 
are of primary concern. It should be noted, however, that, with one trivial ex-
ception, age did not interact with any of the other variables. Thus, the pattern 
of results discussed below held for each age group separately, as well as for 
the sample as a whole. 
The effects of form are summarized in Table 3. Planned comparisons 
within this variable involved (a) positive (If p then q; All p and q) vs nega-
tive (If p then q¯; No p are q) forms, (b) connective (if . . . then) vs. quantifi ed 
(all; no) wordings, and (c) the interaction of a and b. Form signifi cantly af-
fected implication but not falsifi cation responses. The planned comparisons 
showed the effect of form to be due entirely to a higher proportion of impli-
cation evaluations for negative than for positive forms [F(1, 189) = 11.15, p 
<.01]. Although negation is commonly found to decrease the likelihood of re-
sponses conforming to standard logic on various reasoning tasks (e.g., 6, 16, 
Table 2 
Bivariate Distribution Evaluation Frequency for 
Implication vs. Falsifi cation Strategy                                
Number of                              Number of implication evaluations
falsifi cation 
responses  0  1  2  3  4  Total  Exp.a
0  16  11  5  3  2  37  15.45 
1  4  1  2  1  1  9  29.00 
2  1  5  2  0  1  9  20.41 
3  0  2  0  0  1  3  6.39 
4  0  1  2  1  10  14  .75  }7.14 
Total  21  20  11  5  15  72  72 
Exp.a  8.95  24.49  25.14  11.47  1.96  72  
    
       13.45
a Expected frequencies for total based on null hypothesis of independent responses. Combined 
expectations used as indicated in statistical tests to avoid expected frequencies <5. 
}
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30), the present fi ndings are consistent with evidence (a) that negation of the 
consequent (q) of an implication may not have this detrimental effect on perfor-
mance (e.g., 22, 24) and may, in fact, even facilitate it (e.g., 6, 29, 31); and (b) 
that negative universals (“No”) are easier to deal with than positive (“All”) uni-
versals (18). Perhaps this is because forms such as If p then not q and No p are 
q emphasize the single falsifying instance (fl ag), which, depending on the task, 
may be suffi ciently helpful to overcome the additional diffi culty due to the extra 
operation of negation. For present purposes, it is the difference between the two 
tasks (evaluation vs. hypothesis testing) in the effect of (positive vs. negative) 
form that is of particular interest and that will be discussed below. 
Content area signifi cantly affected both evaluations [F(3, 189) = 12.47, p 
< .001] and hypothesis testing [F(3, 189) = 3.05, p < .051. Inspection of Table 
3 reveals that the effect of content, like that of form, was a function of task. 
Specifi cally, evaluation performance was signifi cantly better with engine con-
tent than with any other (each p < .01, Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test), 
while for hypothesis testing engine did not differ signifi cantly from any other 
content area. 
D. Discussion
The fi nding that form and content variables signifi cantly affected reason-
ing performance is neither novel nor surprising. Effects of this sort are already 
well-documented, as noted above. Further exploration of the particular form 
and content variables involved in the present research might help elucidate 
their particular effects, but that would be tangential to the broader concern of 
this article. The focus of this discussion will not be on these particular vari-
ables but rather on the more general implications, for our conceptualization of 
logical reasoning, of the fact that the effects of form and content on problem 
diffi culty were not consistent across tasks. 
One explanation of the form/content × task interaction is that task fac-
tors (in the present study, evaluation vs. hypothesis testing) affect representa-
tion of the form/content information (contrary to postulate 1 above). That is, 
it may be adaptive to represent form/content information differently depend-
ing on whether it will later be used for evaluation or hypothesis testing. This 
is consistent with the contemporary view (e.g., 2) that people do not typically 
analyze individual sentences in isolation. Rather, they seem to construct rep-
resentations on the basis not only of sentential information but also of a vari-
ety of extralinguistic factors, including task demands. 
Another explanation, not inconsistent with the fi rst, is that different forms 
and content yield representations differing in manipulability (already contrary 
to postulate 2) and that, moreover, these differences are a function of task. It 
was hypothesized above, for example, that representations of negative logi-
cal forms may emphasize the falsifying instance. This may be particularly fa-
cilitative for a task in which differentiation of falsifying and nonfalsifying in-
stances is the main requirement (evaluation) but less so for a task in which the 
main diffi culty is not identifying the falsifying instances but rather recogniz-
ing their crucial relevance (hypothesis testing). 
Though each of these explanations is quite plausible, reasoning may actu-
ally be even more complex than they suggest. Consider the fi rst explanation: 
How could task factors affect representation of the form/content information 
before the thinker has begun working on the task (evaluation or hypothesis-
testing)? But how can work on the task begin until the form/content informa-
tion of the propositions involved has been represented? As for the second ex-
planation, if differences in the manipulability of the various representations 
are a function of the processing to be performed on these representations (i.e., 
the task demands), wouldn’t it be adaptive for the thinker to re-represent the 
information in accord with those task demands? In fact, Falmagne (10) sug-
gests on the basis of three experiments with six- year-olds that even young 
children are capable of re-representing information in a more adaptive way 
during the course of processing it. 
Thus, it may not be suffi cient to reject the assumption that representa-
tion diffi culties are solely a function of facility with the information to be rep-
resented and/or the assumption that later processing of the represented infor-
mation is solely a function of facility with the operation(s) necessary to meet 
Table 3 
Proportions and Falsifi cation of Implication Responses on Evaluation Tasks 
and Hypothesis-Testing as a Function of Form and Content 
Variable  Evaluation          Hypothesis-testing 
Form  
If p then q  .35 .29
If p then not q  .50 .33
All p are q  .33 .33
No p are q  .44 .32  
Overall  .41 .32
Content   
Dog .28 .26
Student  .33 .28
Toothpaste  .42 .39
Engine  .60 .35
Overall  .41 .32
260  DAVID MOSHMAN IN THE JOURNAL OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY, 103 (1980) REPRESENTATION AND PROCESS IN REASONING ABOUT LOGICAL RELATIONSHIPS  261
the task demands. Rather, it may be necessary to reject the more basic as-
sumption that representation and process are two successive steps in reason-
ing. Perhaps reasoning typically involves some preliminary representation of 
information, followed by tentative processing of that representation, followed 
by re-representation, followed by further processing, and so on, until the task 
is completed or abandoned. Even more radically, we may conceptualize repre-
sentation and processing as proceeding simultaneously throughout the course 
of reasoning with complex reciprocal interaction between them. Clearly, such 
reasoning would be far more fl exible and adaptive than anything possible 
within the implicit two-step model that underlies most current theories of log-
ical reasoning. 
Of course, even this account remains within the general framework of the 
information-processing tradition. There are several still more radical alterna-
tives that de-emphasize real-time mental processing of information in their 
explanations. One such possibility would be a statistical account of the sort 
proposed by Evans (7), which would make quantitative predictions regarding 
the probabilities of various responses on the basis of a stochastic model of re-
sponse tendencies. Another alternative is the structural approach characteris-
tic of the Genevan school (19), which would attempt to explain the individual 
consistencies in reasoning noted in the present data by postulating underlying 
structural differences in logical cognition. Interestingly, the information-pro-
cessing, statistical, and structural paradigms, though inconsistent and even in-
commensurable in many respects, all fi nd it useful to preserve something akin 
to the representation/process distinction in spite of its attendant complexities. 
Thus, Evans’ recent work (6, 7), including his stochastic model, maintains 
his longstanding distinction between interpretational and operational factors, 
though he now (6, p. 305) rejects his earlier (4) assumption that they combine 
in a simple, additive fashion. Similarly, Piagetian (structural) theory distin-
guishes fi gurative and operative aspects of intelligence, though insisting that 
the two are intricately interdependent. 
The ubiquity of the distinction between representation and process sug-
gests that this conceptual dichotomy may be of theoretical value even if the 
two components are not easily separable steps (cf. 9). Dichotomies are, of 
course, made to be dissolved, and the present data suggest that all is not well, 
or at least not as simple as we might have hoped, with the distinction between 
representation and process. Nevertheless, if we ultimately reject not only the 
notion of two real-time serial steps in reasoning but the more basic distinction 
between representation and process, it will probably not be the result of em-
pirical disconfi rmation but rather the consequence of constructing a more con-
vincing theoretical alternative. 
References
1. Bracewell, R. J., & Hidi, S. E. The solution of an inferential problem as a function 
of stimulus materials. Quart. J. Exper. Psychol., 1974, 26, 480–488. 
2. Bransford, J. D. Human Cognition: Learning, Understanding and Remembering. 
Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1979. 
3. Brée, D. S., & Coppens, G. The diffi culty of an implication task. Brit. J. Psychol., 
1976, 67, 579–586. 
4. Evans, J. St. B. T. On the problems of interpreting reasoning data: Logical and psy-
chological approaches. Cognition, 1972, 1, 373–384. 
5. ———. Interpretation and matching bias in a reasoning task. Quart. J. Exper. Psy-
chol., 1972, 24, 193–199. 
6. ———. Linguistic factors in reasoning. Quart. J. Exper. Psychol., 1977, 29, 
297–306. 
7. ———. Towards a statistical theory of reasoning. Quart. J. Exper. Psychol., 1977, 
29, 621–635. 
8. Evans, J. St. B. T., & Newstead, S. E. Language and reasoning: A study of temporal 
factors. Cognition, 1977, 5, 265–283. 
9. Falmagne, R. J. Overview: Reasoning, representation, process, and related issues. 
In R. J. Falmagne (Ed.), Reasoning: Representation and Process. Hillsdale, N. J.: 
Erlbaum, 1975. Pp. 247–264. 
10. ———. Deductive processes in children. In R. J. Falmagne (Ed.), Reasoning: Rep-
resentation and Process. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1975. Pp. 175–199. 
11. Gilhooley, K. J., & Falconer, W. A. Concrete and abstract terms and relations in 
testing a rule. Quart. J. Exper. Psychol., 1974, 26, 355–359. 
12. Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Tagart, J. How implication is understood. Amer. J. Psy-
chol., 1969, 82, 367–373 
13. Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Wason, P. C. A theoretical analysis of insight into a reason-
ing task. Cogn. Psychol., 1970, 1, 134–148. 
14. Larsen, G. Y. Methodology in developmental psychology: An examination of re-
search on Piagetian theory. Child Devel., 1977, 48, 1160–1166. 
15. Marcus, S. L., & Rips, L. J. Conditional reasoning. J. Verb. Learn. & Verb. Behav., 
1979, 18, 199–223. 
16. Moshman, D. Consolidation and stage formation in the emergence of formal oper-
ations. Devel. Psychol., 1977, 13, 95–100. 
17. ———. Development of formal hypothesis-testing ability. Devel. Psychol., 1979, 
15, 104–112. 
18. Neimark, E. D., & Chapman, R. H. Development of the comprehension of logi-
cal quantifi ers. In R. J. Falmagne (Ed.), Reasoning: Representation and Process. 
Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1975, 135–151. 
19. Piaget, J. Structuralism. New York: Harper & Row, 1970. 
262  DAVID MOSHMAN IN THE JOURNAL OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY, 103 (1980)
20. ———. The Grasp of Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1976. 
21. Revlis, R. Syllogistic reasoning: Logical decisions from a complex data base. In R. 
J. Falmagne (Ed.), Reasoning: Representation and Process. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erl-
baum, 1975. Pp. 93–133. 
22.  Roberge, J. J. Linguistic and psychometric factors in propositional reasoning. 
Quart. J. Exper. Psychol., 1918, 30, 705–716. 
23. Roberge, J. J., & Antonak, R. F. Effects of familiarity with content on propositional 
reasoning. J. Gen. Psychol., 1979, 100, 35–41. 
24. Roberge, J. J., & Mason, E. J. Effects of negation on adolescents’ class and condi-
tional reasoning abilities. J. Cen. Psychol., 1978, 98, 187–195. 
25. Smalley, N. S. Evaluating a rule against possible instances. Brit. J. Psychol., 1974, 
65, 293–304. 
26. Taplin, J. E., & Staudenmayer, A. Interpretation of abstract conditional sentences 
in deductive reasoning. J. Verb. Learn. G Verb. Behav., 1973, 12, 530–542. 
27. Van Duyne, P. C. Necessity and contingency in reasoning. Acta Psychol., 1976, 40, 
85–101. 
28. Wason, P. C. Reasoning about a rule. Quart. J. Exper. Psychol., 1968, 20, 
273–281. 
29. Wason, P. C., & Evans, J. St. B. T. Dud processes in reasoning? Cognition, 1974/75, 
3, 141–154. 
30. Wason, P. C., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. Psychology of Reasoning: Structure and Con-
tent. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1912. 
31. Wildman, T. M., & Fletcher, H. J. Developmental increases and decreases in solu-
tions of conditional syllogism problems. Devel. Psychol., 1977, 13, 630–636. 
